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TAX ACCOUNTING FOR PREPAID INCOME-1967
COLIN E.

T

:

For many years one of the most difficult questions faced by
accrual method taxpayers has been how to account for prepaid
income. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue has always contended that an accrual basis taxpayer must include prepayments
in income upon receipt. Judicial decisions have often seemed to
conflict both with each other and with commercial accounting
techniques. However, since the 1963 Supreme Court decision in
iSohlude v. Comrn'r,l the courts have largely resolved the issue.
Hereafter all advance payments received by accrual method taxpayers in exchange for goods or services will probably have to
be included in gross income in the year of receipt.
There are some quite valid business and tax objections to this
departure from normal accounting practice, but as a practical
matter taxpayers have very little hope of reversing the trend.
Nevertheless there is at least one issue in the prepaid income
field which still deserves consideration. This article will attempt
to show that, although the government's position is generally
invulnerable, the recent extension of the Schlude doctrine to the
sale-of-goods area2 may be unjustified.

A. The P'oblem'n
Assume, for example, that an imaginary corporation, Information Inc. ("the Company"), is in the business of conducting
market surveys for manufacturing companies. In a typical case
a customer retains Information Inc. in December of 1967 to conduct market surveys during 1968. The contract specifies that
Information Inc. will give the customer a written report at the
end of each quarter. The fee is 10,000 dollars per year payable
in advance, but the customer may cancel the contract and receive
a partial refund at the end of any quarter if dissatisfied.
Information Inc. is on the accrual method of accounting, and
its books are kept on a calendar year basis. As of December 31,
1967, ten customers have contracted for the Company's services
* LL.B. University of South Carolina. LL.M. (taxation) New York
University. Mr. Harley is associated with the firm of Davis, Polk, Wardwell,

Sunderland & Kiendl, New York, New York.

1. 372 U.S. 128 (1963).
2. Hagen Advertising Displays, Inc., 47 T.C. 139 (1966).
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during 1968, and advance payments of 100,000 dollars have been
received and deposited in the Company's general checking account. It can be estimated with reasonable accuracy that the
Company will incur 60,000 dollars of expenses in performing
the services during 1968. At this point the Company must decide
how to treat the 100,000 dollars of prepaid fees. There are three
possibilities:
(1) to include the 100,000 dollars in gross income for 1967
and to deduct the 60,000 dollars of related expenses in 1968;
(2) to include the 100,000 dollars in gross income in 1968
when the services are performed and the related expenses
are incurred; or
(3) to include the 100,000 dollars in 1967 gross income
and to take a 60,000 dollar deduction in 1967 for estimated
expenses related to the prepaid income.
The issue is not whether an item of income is taxable but is
when it is taxable. Timing can have a dramatic effect on taxable
income and, therefore, on the effective tax rate in many situations. In the hypothetical case above, the first alternative method
of treating the prepayments tends to distort the computation
of taxable income. By including the full 100,000 dollars of prepayments in 1967, a small corporation may have artificially
high income in that year and may pay a tax on the prepayments
at the maximum rate of 48 percent. The next year, when the
related expenses are incurred, taxable income may fall below
25,000 dollars to a tax rate of 22 percent, and a portion of the
surtax exemption may be wasted. An individual taxpayer who
receives prepayments may be affected even more because of the
application of graduated rates to his prepaid income. On the
other hand, the second and third alternatives seem to give a
more accurate picture of taxable income by putting both the
income and the related expenses into a single taxable year.
The main consideration which has prompted the Treasury to
insist on including prepayments in gross income upon receipt
seems to be revenue. Although prepaid income which is received
in 1967 will eventually be taxed under any of the alternatives,
the government, like most creditors, would like to be paid off
as soon as possible. The government has the additional argument
that a corporation which has 100,000 dollars of prepaid taxable
income every year will, in effect, obtain a permanent interest-
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free loan of 48,000 dollars (the potential tax) if the prepaid
income is deferred to a later year. The revenue from an enormous
amount of prepaid income would be suspended indefinitely.
B. Accounting Principles
Section 446 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 provides
the ground rules for determining proper accounting methods.3
(a) GENERAL RULE-Taxable income shall be computed under the method of accounting on the basis of which
the taxpayer regularly computes his income in keeping his
books.
(b) EXCEPTIONS-If no method of accounting has
been regularly used by the taxpayer, or if the method used
does not clearly reflect income, the computation of taxable
income slzal be made under such method as, in the opinion
of the Secretary or his delegate, does clearly reflect income.4
(Emphasis added.)
The Internal Revenue Service has understandably relied on
commercial accounting concepts in administering section 446.
A method of accounting which reflects the consistent application of generally accepted accounting principles in a
particular trade or business in accordance with accepted conditions or practices in that trade or business will ordinarily
be regarded as clearly reflecting income, provided all items
of gross income and expense are treated consistently from
year to year. 5
The dominant purpose of accrual method accounting is to
"match" revenues with expenses in order to reflect clearly the
results of a business operation. 6
The revenues of a particular period should be charged
with the costs which are reasonably associated with the product represented by such revenues.7
3. This has been the governing language since section 212(b) of the

Revenue Act of 1918 was enacted.

4. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 446.
5. Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1 (a) (2), T.D. 6282, 1958-1 Cum. BULL. 215.
6. AmERICAN INSTITUTE OF ACCOUNTANTS, ACCOUNTING TERMINOLOGy
BULL., No. 2, 3 (1955).
7. PAToN & LITTLETON, AN INTRODUCTION TO CoRPoaARE AccouNTING
STANDARDS, 69 (1940).
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Reviewing the alternatives which Information Inc. had in
the hypothetical situation previously outlined, a commercial accountant would either (1) defer the inclusion of the 1967 prepayments until 1968 or (2) include them in 1967 and deduct a
reserve for the related estimated expenses in the same year. In
no other way could the revenues and expenses be "matched".
Moreover, since income is said to accrue for tax purposes when
8
"all events" fixing the right to the income have occurred, Information Inc. should defer the 100,000 dollars in prepayments
from income until the Company has fulfilled its obligations
under the contract and the right to the income is "fixed".
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue long ago decided that
the usual principles of accrual accounting would not serve the
government's purpose in the prepaid income controversy. The
Commissioner found a potent weapon for protecting the revenues
in section 446(b). 9 That section provides that "if the method
used does not clearly reflect income," the Secretary or his delegate may choose a method which, "in the opinion of the Secretary or his delegate," does clearly reflect income.

THE CLAIM OF RIGHT DOCTRINE
The early cases dealing with prepaid income seem to have
been influenced by the "claim of right" doctrine, which was first
expounded by the Supreme Court in Nortk American Oil Consol
v. Bumnet.10 In that case a cash basis taxpayer whose business
had been temporarily placed in receivership attempted to recover
the assets and the 1916 earnings which the receiver had collected.
In 1917, a district court ordered the receiver to turn the assets
over to the taxpayer. The receiver complied with the order, and
an appeal was filed by the government. The government's appeal
was finally dismissed in 1922. In considering the income tax
consequences of the litigation, the Supreme Court rejected the
taxpayer's contention that the income should be included in
1922 when the appeal was dismissed. The Court held that the
proper year for including the earnings from 1916 in the taxpayer's income was 1917, the year in which the "earnings" were
received "under a claim of right and without restriction as to
its disposition.""
8. See United States v. Anderson, 269 U.S. 422 (1926), and Treas. Reg.
§ 1.451-1(a), as amended, T.D. 6282, 1958-1 Cum. BULL. 215.
9. Iwr. REv. CoDE of 1954, § 446(b).
10. 286 U.S. 417 (1932).
11. Id. at 424.
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The Commissioner of Internal Revenue had no difficulty in
persuading the Supreme Court to apply the claim of right doctrine to prepaid income. 12 Thereafter a number of cases and
rulings required accrual basis taxpayers to include prepayments
in gross income in the year of receipt if they were received under
a claim of right and "without restriction as to disposition." 3
From a technical point of view, the claim of right doctrine
was not an appropriate theory for deciding prepaid income
cases. 14 In North Am& an Oil, money which had been "earned"
in 1916 had to be included in income when it was received in
1917 under a claim of right. In contrast, prepaid income of
an accrual method taxpayer does not become "earnings" until
the recipient fulfills his obligations in respect to the income.
Until performance has been completed, the taxpayer's right to
the funds he received has not accrued.' 5 During the 1950's, several courts of appeals perceived the flaw in the government's
claim of right argument, and taxpayers began winning some
cases in the prepaid income field.'(
THE TAXPAYERS' VICTORIES
The courts which rejected the Treasury's position on prepaid
income usually did so because the Commissioner was unable to
prove that the matching of income with expenses did not clearly
reflect income. The taxpayers argued logically and successfully
that tax accounting and commercial accounting should be reconciled and that commercial accounting requires income to be
matched with related expenses within the same accounting
period.
12. In Brown v. Helvering, 291 U.S. 193 (1934), the Supreme Court cited
North American Oil and held that a fire insurance agent on the accural
method had to include all commissions in income upon receipt even though the
commissions were subject to refund in the event any policies were cancelled.

13. See Automobile Club of Mich. v. Comm'r, 353 U.S. 180 (1957) (membership dues); South Dade Farms, Inc. v. Comm'r, 138 F2d 818 (5th Cir.
1943) (prepaid rent); New Capitol Hotel, Inc., 28 T.C. 706 (1957) (prepaid
rent); Capital Warehouse Co., 9 T.C. 966 (1947) (services); National Airlines, Inc., 9 T.C. 159 (1947) (advance sales of tickets); Your Health Club,
Inc., 4 T.C. 385 (1944) (membership dues); South Tacoma Motor Co., 3
T.C. 411 (1944) (future services); Rev. Rul. 58-225, 1958-1 Cum. BULL. 258
(prepaid interest).
14. See Behren, Prepaid .tncorne-Accounting Concepts and the Tax Law,
15 TAx LAw REv. 343 (1960).
15. This point was finally conceded by the government in American Auto.

Ass'n v. United States, 367 U.S. 687 (1961).
16. For example, the Tenth Circuit specifically denied the relevance of the
"claim of right" doctrine in Beacon Publishing Co. v. Comm'r, 218 F.2d 697,
699-700 (10th Cir. 1955).
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In Beacon Publishing Co. v. Comm'

a1

7

a newspaper publisher

received advance payments on subscriptions, some of which extended several years into the future. The prepaid income was
spread over the lives of the subscriptions for tax purposes, a
proportionate amount of the prepayments being taken into gross
income each year.' 8 The Tenth Circuit upheld the taxpayer's
method of accounting for prepayments as a clear reflection of
income.
The tax court, as it has in other cases, took the literal language from the context of the opinions in the foregoing
cases and applied it to the prepaid income here even though
there is no dispute as to the ownership of the funds. It gave
no consideration to the fact that the taxpayer accounts for
its income under the accrual method and will not incur the
expenses necessary to earn the income until following taxable years. In other words, the tax court holds that advance
payments received by a taxpayer which are subject to income tax, must be returned in the year of receipt if owned
or claimed by the taxpayer, regardless of the method of
accounting, which has been adopted, or when the funds are
actually earned .... The application of the doctrine would
in most cases result in a distortion of an accrual taxpayer's
true income. 19
The Second Circuit allowed prepaid income for personal
services to be spread evenly over the lives of the service contracts
in Bressner Radio, Inc. v. Comm'r.20 The taxpayer received prepayments near the end of its 1948 and 1949 fiscal years for oneyear contracts to service television sets. Prior experience showed
that the taxpayer would make from eight to twelve calls on each
customer during the contract year. Accordingly, in both 1948
and 1949 a portion of the income was deferred until the later
fiscal year during which the services were performed. The Court
17. 218 F.2d 697 (10th Cir. 1955).
18. In an early ruling the Commissioner had permitted the very method

which the taxpayer in Beacon Publishing Co. adopted. See I.T. 3369, 1940-1
Cum. BuLL. 46. The apparent inconsistency of the Commissioner's position in
Beacon Publishing Co. was explained by the argument that, although the

deferral method might be permissible for taxpayers who had always used it,
the publisher in this case could not change to the deferral method without the
Commissioner's permission. See Ir. REv. CoDE of 1954, § 446(e).
19. Beacon Publishing Co. v. Comm'r, 218 F2d 697, 700 (10th Cir. 1955).
20. 267 C2d 520 (2d Cir. 1959). Cf. Streight Radio & Television, Inc. v.
Comm'r, 280 F.2d 883 (7th Cir. 1960).
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of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit rejected the Commissioner's
claim of right argument and stated:
In conclusion, petitioner's regularly employed method of
accounting on an accrual basis and its deferral of income
so that it most closely matched the corresponding expenses
clearly reflected its true income. Its method and the statistical material supporting its figures were not "purely artificial." They bore a carefully estimated relationship to the
services petitioner would be called upon to render. The
record does not reveal a factual basis for permitting the
Commissioner to adopt a method of his own on the ground
that petitioner's method "does not clearly reflect income." 2 '
The taxpayer in Bressner Radio was very careful to prove
that the expenses related to the prepayments were incurred
evenly and predictably over the contract period. This allowed
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit to distinguish
Automobile Club v. Com 1'r, 22 in which prepaid dues were required to be included when received. In that case the Supreme
Court felt that deferral of income over the life of a membership
was "artificial" because the taxpayer had not shown that the
obligations and expenses related to the prepayments were incurred evenly throughout the period. If expenses occurred arbitrarily and sporadically, the Court reasoned, spreading the income would not necessarily "match" income with expenses. 23
The second way of matching income with related expenses
is to include prepayments in the year of receipt but to deduct
in the same year a reserve for the estimated related expenses, on
the theory that the liability to perform services, deliver goods,
or otherwise incur expenses is "fixed" when the prepayments
are received. In Schuessler v. Comm'r 24 a taxpayer sold furnaces
and as part of the bargain agreed to cut them on and off at the
beginning and the end of each winter for five years. The entire
sales price was taken into income in the year of the sale, but
the estimated cost of the future service calls was simultaneously
deducted. Because the taxpayer incurred a legal liability in the
21. Bressner Radio, Inc. v. Comm'r, 267 F.2d 520, 529 (10th Cir. 1955).
22. 353 U.S. 180 (1957).
23. For two other cases allowing prepayments to be deferred, see Bayshore
Gardens, Inc. v. Comm'r, 267 F2d 55 (2d Cir. 1959) and Smith Motors, Inc.
v. United States, ff 61-2 CCH U.S. Tax Cas.
9627 (D. Vt. 1961).
24. 230 F.2d 722 (5th Cir. 1956).
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year of the sale to make service calls at regular intervals in the
future, the Fifth Circuit decided that "petitioner's method of
accounting comes much closer to giving a correct picture of
his income" 25 and to coinciding with commercial accounting
26
techniques.
At the end of the 1950's, there was a clear conflict in the cases.
The Commissioner and the Tax Court were solidly allied against
the taxpayers. But the arguments presented by the taxpayers
persuaded the Second, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth and Tenth Circuit
Courts of Appeals to reverse the Tax Court and to allow the
matching of income and expenses.
(. The Role of Congress
Congress recognized the need for more certainty in the prepaid income area. Because of the split in judicial decisions, some
taxpayers were able to match income with expenses, while others
were not. Enacted with the Internal Revenue Code of 1951 were
two new provisions designed to allow commercial accounting
principles to govern prepaid income and to place all taxpayers
on the same basis. Section 452 allowed prepaid income of an
accrual method taxpayer to be spread over a five-year period
if the taxpayer's normal method of commercial accounting would
permit. Section 462 allowed an accrual taxpayer to deduct reasonable reserves for estimated expenses.
The impact of sections 452 and 462 upon the revenues apparently had been grossly underestimated. In 1955, the Secretary
of the Treasury asked Congress to repeal the sections retroactively, and Congress obliged.2 7 It seems clear from the legislative history that the repeal was intended to be neutral, at least
in respect to prepaid subscription income.
The Secretary of the Treasury in the letter previously referred to which he sent to the chairman of the House Committee on Ways and Means indicated that the repeal of
section 452 would not be taken as an indication by the
25. Id. at 723.
26. Deductions for estimated expenses had also been allowed earlier in
Harrold v. Comm'r, 192 F.2d 1002 (4th Cir. 1951) (strip miner allowed to
deduct cost of "backfilling" the mine as required by state law) and Pacific
Grape Products Co. v. Comm'r, 219 F.2d 862 (9th Cir. 1955) (fruit canner
allowed to deduct estimated packing and shipping charges in accordance with
industry-wide practice). See also Denise Coal Co. v. Comm'r, 271 F.2d 930
(3d Cir. 1959).

27. Sec. 1, P.L. 84-74 (1955), 1955-2 Cum. Bum. 748.
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Treasury Department of congressional intent as to the proper treatment of prepaid subscription income under prior
law or under other provisions of the 1954 Code. He also
indicated that the repeal of section 452 will not be considered by the Department as either acceptance or rejection
by Congress of the decision in Beacon Publishing Company
v. C'ommissioner or in any other judicial decisions. It has
come to your committee's attention that the vast majority
of publishing concerns having prepaid income are already
deferring their income with Treasury approval. It is recommended to the Treasury Department that it modify its
published ruling to the end that the remaining publishers
may be entitled to defer prepaid subscription income so

28
that they may be placed upon a fair and equitable basis.

In later years, however, when considering the general problem
of prepaid income, the Supreme Court attached great significance to the series of events leading to the repeal of sections 452
9

and 462.2

Eventually Congress was persuaded to relieve two classes of
taxpayers from the prepaid income problem, because of special
circumstances which were felt to burden the two groups unduly.
Section 455 of the 1954 Code30 allows a publisher of a "newspaper, magazine or other periodical" to elect to spread prepaid
subscription income over the subscription period; if the publisher's commercial method of accounting would permit the
deferral. Section 456 extends a similar privilege to prepaid dues
of "membership organizations" which come within the definition
of that section.8 ' There has been no further Congressional action
in the prepaid income area since 1961.
D. The A.A.A. and Schlude Cases
In 1961 the Supreme Court dealt squarely with the prepaid
income issue in American Auto. Ass'n ,v.United States.82 Another automobile club had raised and lost the same issue in
1957,11

but the American Automobile Association (hereafter

28. S. REP. No. 372, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 1955-2 Cum. Buu.m 852, 861. See
also H. REP. No. 293, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 1955-2 Ctmc. Bum. 855.
29. See American Auto. Ass'n v. United States, 367 U.S. 687 (1961).

30. IxT. Ray. CODE of 1954, § 455, as amended, 72 Stat. 1625 (1958).
31. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 456, as amended, 75 Stat. 222 (1961).

32. 367 U.S. 687 (1961).
33. Automobile Club of Mich. v. Comm'r, 353 U.S. 180 (1957).
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"A.A.A.") contended that it had substantially stronger evidence
than had been presented in the earlier case. The A.A.A.'s activities consisted of supplying its members with road maps, advice
on travel routes, emergency road service, automobile insurance,
and bail bond protection. Memberships ran for a year, dues were
collected in advance, and the funds were used by the A.A.A.
without restriction.
The services were rendered to members upon request; therefore, there was a variance in the amount of service rendered to
one member as compared with that rendered to another member,
and there was an over-all variance from month to month. The
A.A.A. produced accountants who testified that such minor
irregularities did not prevent an accountant from spreading
prepayments over the period of membership so long as there
was a rough monthly average in the pattern of related expenses.
The Supreme Court majority, however, felt that a "rough"
over-all average was an inadequate basis for proper tax administration.
That "irregularity," however, is highly relevant to the
clarity of an accounting system which defers receipt, as
earned income, of dues to a taxable period in which no, some,
or all the services paid for by those dues may or may not
be rendered. The Code exacts its revenue from the individual
member's dues which, no one disputes, constitute income.
When their receipt as earned income is recognized ratably
over two calendar years, without regard to correspondingly
fixed individual expense or performance justification, but
consistently with overall experience, their accounting doubtless presents a rather accurate image of the total financial
structure, but fails to respect the criteria of annual tax accounting and may be rejected by the Commissioner.84
A much more important aspect of the Supreme Court opinion
in the A.A.A. case was the discussion of the repeal of sections
452 and 462 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
This repeal, we believe, confirms our view that the method
used by the Association could be rejected by the Commissioner. While the claim is made that Congress did not
"intend to disturb prior law as it affected permissible accrual accounting provisions for tax purposes," 11. R. Rep.
34. American Auto. Ass'n v. United States, 367 U.S. 687, 692 (1961).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol19/iss2/2

10

Harley: Tax Accounting for Prepaid Income--1967
[Vol. 19
SouT
CAROLINA LAW REVmW

No. 293, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5, the cold fact is that it
repealed the only law incontestably permitting the practice
upon which the Association depends. To say that, as to
taxpayers using such systems, Congress was merely declaring existing law when it adopted § 452 in 1954, and that it
was merely restoring unaffected the same prior law when
it repealed the new section in 1955 for good reason, is a contradiction in itself, "varnishing nonsense with the charm
of sound."8 5
The Court then held that the Commissioner had explicit discretion under section 446 to reject a taxpayer's method of accounting and that the rejection of the A.A.A. accounting method
was a valid exercise of that discretion.
Four members of the Court in A.A.A. joined in a sharp dissent. They stated flatly that the repeal of sections 452 and 462
had no significance whatever in view of the legislative history.
The minority also felt that the principles of commercial accounting as applied in Bressner Radio38 and Beacon Pubishing (o.3?
should be applied to prepaid income.38
The split in the Supreme Court in the A.A.A. case, although
interesting from an academic standpoint, was of little comfort
to taxpayers with prepaid income. The only hope lay in attempting to limit A.A.A. to its facts. The Supreme Court quickly dismissed that possibility in Bo/dude v. Comm'r. 39 The taxpayer in
Sohlude operated a dance studio. Students either paid tuition in
advance or signed negotiable notes which the taxpayer immediately discounted at a bank. The students were entitled to a
designated number of lesson hours, but no refunds were granted
if the lessons were not taken.
The Schlude decision followed the A.A.A. case in every respect. The Court split 5-4, upholding the Commissioner's rejection of the deferral of prepayments. Both the majority and the
dissenters repeated the views they had expressed in A.A.A.
The Schlude facts were not really appropriate for testing the
scope of the A.A.A. case. As in A.A.A. the services in the
iSo/dude case were rendered only upon the demand of the cus35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id. at 695.
267 F.2d 520
218 F.2d 697
367 U.S. 687,
372 U.S. 128

(2d Cir. 1959).
(10th Cir. 1955).
713 (1961).
(1963).
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tomer. Facts such as those in Beacon Publishing Go. and the
ScAuessler case, in which the liabilities related to the prepayments were incurred evenly and predictably over the life of the
40
contracts, have yet to be considered by the Supreme Court.
Nevertheless, since the Sehlude case was decided, not one case
has allowed prepayments to be deferred. Schlude has been applied both to prevent deferrals of prepaid income, 41 and to
disallow deductions of reserves for estimated expenses related
42
to prepayments.
Although there seems to be an inevitable trend in the postSchiude cases, there is a theoretical possibility that Beacon Publishing Co., Bressner Radio, and the Schuessler' case are still
alive.43 Most of the post-Schlude cases have been Tax Court
decisions which have not been appealed; and the Tax Court has
never admitted, even prior to A.A.A. and Schude, that the taxpayer may have a valid argument for deferral. Because Schude
may have discouraged taxpayers from appealing Tax Court
decisions, neither the courts of appeals nor the Supreme Court
have, since 1963, considered any prepaid income cases with the
strong factual patterns which were presented in Beacon, Bressner, and Sehueesler. Admittedly, however, the chance of a taxpayer victory in this area is slight.
E. Ewtension of Sehlude to Sale of Goods
The tax accounting rule which has emerged from the A.A.A.
and Schude cases is a policy decision based upon the need to
protect the Federal revenues. It is neither "right" nor "wrong"
in the legal sense, but it is generally accepted as the prevailing
40. Beacon Publishing Co. and Schuessler were carefully distinguished on
this basis in Automobile Club of Mich. v. Comm'r, 353 U.S. 180, 189 (1957)
(footnote 20 of the opinion) and again in American Auto. Ass'n v. United
States, 367 U.S. 687, 691 (1961) (footnote 4 of the opinion).
41. See Parkchester Beach Club Corp. v. Comm'r, 335 F.2d 478 (2d Cir.
1964) (membership dues); Paul B. Huebner, T.C. Mem. 1966-73 (attorney's
fees) ; William 0. McMahon, Inc., 45 T.C. 221 (1965) (information service);
E. Morris Cox, 43 T.C. 448 (1965) (investment services); Rev. Rul. 65-141,
1965-1 Cum. Buu.. 210 (rent held in escrow).

42. See Villafranca v. Comm'r, 359 F.2d 849 (6th Cir. 1966) (dance lessons); Michael V. Lawless, T.C. Mem. 1966-12 (dance lessons); Bell Electric Co., 45 T.C. 158 (1965) (deduction of reserve for warranty expenses);
Simplified Tax Records, Inc., 41 T.C. 75 (1963) (accounting services).
43. The Second Circuit majority opined in Automobile Club of N.Y. v.
Comm'r, 304 F.2d 781 (2d Cir. 1962), that Bressner Radio had not been overruled by the A.A.A. case. In addition, Beacon Publishing Co. and Schuessler
were distinguished on the facts by the Supreme Court in Automobile Club of
Mich. and A.A.A.
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administrative law. However, the scope of the recent extension
of Sohlude into the sale-of-goods situation seems to be legally
"wrong.""4

In the 19,0's when nearly all of the judicial decisions denied
the taxpayers' attempts to defer prepaid income, an important
distinction was made, i.e., that gross receipts from the sale of
goods could not be subjected to the Commissioner's rule on
prepaid income.
The trouble with his argument is that its major premise
is unsound. The amounts in question were actually, as the
stipulation shows, a part of the cost of goods sold and are
not being claimed by this petitioner as a deduction under
section 23. Section 23 makes no provision for the cost of
goods sold, but the Commissioner has always recognized, as
indeed he must to stay within the Constitution, that the
cost of goods sold must be deducted from gross receipts in
order to arrive at gross income. No more than gross income
can be subjected to income tax upon any theory. (Emphasis
added.)

45

Prepayments from the sale of goods can clearly be included
in income in the year of receipt, but only if the amount included
is gross receipts less the cost of goods sold, i.e., the gross income
from sales.46 Nevertheless, in 1965 the Tax Court applied the
Schlude doctrine to gross receipts from sales of goods ;47 but the
taxpayer in that case apparently failed to raise the cost-of-goods
issue.
The Tax Court did deal with the problem in 1966 in Hagen
Advertising Displays, In. 48 The taxpayer made and sold tradename signs to nationwide business concerns. The customers often
placed large "blanket" orders and paid in advance. At the end
of each taxable year the taxpayer had in its closing inventory
account partially completed signs and signs which were completed but not yet delivered. The taxpayer had consistently
deferred the inclusion of prepayments for tax purposes until
the signs were delivered.
44. See Hagen Advertising Displays, Inc., 47 T.C. 139 (1966).
45. Lela Sullenger, 11 T.C. 1076, 1077 (1948). See also Woodlawn Park
Cemetery Co. 16 T.C. 1067 (1951); Veenstra & DeHaan Coal Co. 11 T.C.
964 (1948); Treas. Reg. § 1.61-3(a).
46. Fifth and York Co. 65-1 CCH U.S. Tax Cas.
9155 (W.D. Ky. 1965).
47. Chester Farrara, 44 T.C. 189 (1965).
48. 47 T.C. 139 (1966).
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The Tax Court, citing ,Scude, held that the Commissioner
clearly had discretion to require the taxpayer to include the
prepayments in the year of receipt. The taxpayer then argued
that, given the Commissioner's power to require immediate inclusion, the amount to be included in any one year could not
include the cost of goods sold. The Tax Court dismissed that
objection with a rather subtle legalistic discussion of the method
of accounting for the cost of goods.
The same regulation defining "gross income"' in a manufacturing business (see. 1.61-3 (a), supra fn. 2) on which petitioner relies in arguing that receipts from sales are not
"gross income" since cost of goods sold must be subtracted
therefrom to arrive at "gross income" provides that "The
cost of goods sold should be determined in accordance with
the method of accounting consistently used by the taxpayer."
Nothing in this regulation suggests that an attempt must
be made to match a particular purchase with a particular
sale or a particular item in inventory. In fact in the case
of this petitioner, no attempt is made to keep records in such
a manner, and insofar as the record shows petitioner would
be unable from its records to determine the precise cost or
amount of gain realized from the sale of any particular
sign. Petitioner makes no argument that either its cost of
goods sold or inventories are incorrectly computed, and
respondent has made no change in either amount as reported
49
by petitioner for either year here in issue.
According to the Tax Court's theory the constitutional requirement-that only the gross profits from the sale of goods may be
treated as gross income-would be satisfied if in some future
year when the goods are delivered a "deduction" or offset of
some kind is allowed for the cost of the goods. This is an obvious deviation from basic tax theory. The difference between
a return of capital (the cost of goods sold) and a "deduction
from gross income" is well known. If prepaid gross receipts from
sales are fully included in the year of receipt, there will be a
direct tax upon capital (cost of goods sold) in that year.50 The
allowance of an offset in a later year for the cost of goods deliv49. Id. at 147.

50. Presumably such a tax would be invalid unless "apportioned" among the
states. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 9. See Pollock Farmers Loan & Trust Co., 157
U.S. 429 (1895).
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cred would hardly cure the apparently unconstitutional taxation in the year of receipt.
Respondent's adjustments in this case, because they ignore
the cost of goods sold, would go beyond a mere recomputation of taxable income using a different method of accounting from that used by petitioner; they would expand the
scope of the Government's taxing power established in the
Code (Sec. 61) as interpreted by respondent's own regulations. Such a result cannot be sustained under the guise of
a section 446(b) accounting method adjustment.5 '
Unfortunately the taxpayer in Hagen failed to appeal the
decision. Hopefully in the near future a braver taxpayer will
try to overturn what appears to be a basically erroneous extension of the Schlude doctrine.
F. Gonolusion
It may be helpful to summarize the current status of prepaid
income. All prepayments for services must be included in income
in the year of receipt as a general rule. There is a very remote
possibility that a court of appeals would reverse the Tax Court
and allow deferral of prepayments to match expenses, provided
the related expenses were incurred evenly and predictably during the period of performance.
Publishers and certain membership organizations have specific statutory authority in sections 455 and 456 for deferring
prepaid income.
Prepayments from the sale of goods may be included in the
year of receipt, but the amount included should be limited to
gross profits, notwithstanding the Commissioner's successful
inclusion of gross receipts in Hagen Advertising Displays.
Possibly the most effective way to combat the problem is to
stop accepting prepayments. In Decision, Inc., 52 the Commis-

sioner successfully required the taxpayer to include prepayments
in the year of receipt during 1959-62. The taxpayer turned the
tables by refusing to accept any advance payments during 1963.
A net operating loss resulted, and the carrybacku3 of the loss to
1960 produced a refund.
51. Hagen Advertising Displays, Inc., 47 T.C. 139, 153 (dissenting opinion

of Tax Court Judges Hoyt and Forrester).

52. 47 T.C. 58 (1966).
53. INT. REV. CoDE of 1954, § 172.

Published by Scholar Commons, 1967

15

